Does grassroots participation improve public service delivery? We study the e ect of a mobile phone application that allows citizens to monitor school construction projects in Brazilian municipalities. The app provides a platform where users can submit photos of construction sites, consult independent engineers, and contact the mayor's o ce about project delays. Our results show that the app has a null impact on the school construction outcomes. Additionally, we nd that politicians are unresponsive to individual requests. The results question the impact of local monitoring on public service performance and suggest that interventions targeted at other groups may produce better policy outcomes. for their helpful comments. We are specially grateful to Catarina Roman and the sta of Transparência Brasil for their excellent research assistance. This research was pre-registered on the EGAP pre-registry tool (https://egap.org/registration/4505) and approved by the Brazilian Ministry of Education. The authors thank the 2016 Google Social Impact Challenge for nancial support and declare that there are no con ict of interest. Replication data and code are available at
Introduction
A robust accountability system is crucial for e cient public services provision (Besley and Ghatak 2003; Cameron 2004; Ferejohn 1986; O'Donnell 1998) . In its standard de nition, accountability is understood as the process of holding authorities responsible for their actions (Finer 1941; Mulgan 2000; O'Loughlin 1990) . Past studies show that accountability has a positive impact on governance, as it ensures that politicians act on behalf of voters (Freire 2010 ; Moncrie e 1998), reduces the opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption (Deininger and Mpuga 2005; Wenar 2006) , and improves the quality of public services (Adsera et al. 2003; Björkman and Svensson 2009) . Recent research also suggests that accountability leads to higher economic growth because it limits state discretion in the economy and increases long-term investments in human capital (Benhabib and Przeworski 2010; Suebvises 2018; Ponzetto and Troiano 2018) .
However, accountability systems take many forms. One promising model is that of bottom-up monitoring, in which citizens receive information about the shortcomings of a given project so they can evaluate and pressure underperforming public o cials (Kosack and Fung 2014; Molina et al. 2016; Ra er et al. 2018) . Proponents argue that bottom-up accountability is e ective because: 1) constituents have rst-hand information about the outcomes of local policies; 2) citizens have incentives to attack corruption that directly a ects themselves; 3) policy-makers are sensitive to social punishment from their own communities (Serra 2011, 570) . In this regard, bottom-up accountability o ers a potential solution to the principal-agent dilemma in public service by aligning the interests of state o cials with those of the constituency they serve (Barro 1973; Ra er et al. 2018, 2) .
Here we assess the impact of Tá de Pé (TDP), a mobile phone application designed to lower the costs of evaluating public works and punish political representatives in Brazil. Developed by Transparência Brasil 1 , TDP allows citizens to learn the location of public school construction sites, check their completion status, and anonymously request information from competent authorities. TDP users can also take pictures of the construction sites and submit them to independent engineers for examination. If the engineers classify the construction as delayed, TDP prompts users to send a message to the mayor's o ce asking for completion estimates and explanations about the construction 1 Transparência Brasil is an non-governmental organisation whose mission is to 'promote transparency and social control of public power'. It has been active since April 2000, receives no public funding, and is non-partisan. More information at http://transparencia.org.br (access: July 2019). status. TDP has been online since April 2017 and was the winner of the 2016 Google Social Impact grant with more than 200,000 popular votes 2 .
We use the TDP app to conduct two experimental interventions and test its impact on ve outcomes related to school completion rates and complaints to public authorities. Overall, our results show that providing information to citizens has no consistent impact on policy outcomes. In the rst experiment, we nd that the TDP app increased the likelihood of construction cancellation by 2 percent, but the result does not replicate. The remaining ve models have null results. In our second intervention, none of the estimations reach conventional levels of statistical signi cance.
Importantly, all coe cients are small, what suggests that even if the TDP app had a signi cant e ect on the outcomes, its substantive impact would be virtually negligible. their neighbourhoods, and that information will be assessed by a group of independent specialists.
In the case the construction is behind schedule, TDP provides a writing platform whereby citizens can report to public o cials quickly and anonymously. The app then prompts citizens to write a noti cation to the mayor's o ce, which has 15 days to reply. If they do not respond to the request, 2 About 1,000 Brazilian charities participated in the 2016 Google Social Impact Challenge. An independent committee selected 10 organisations as nalists, and Transparência Brasil won the challenge with about 200,000 popular votes. To know more about the contest, please visit https://impactchallenge.withgoogle.com/brazil2016 (access: July 2019).
3 Tá de Pé is an informal Brazilian expression for 'is it done?'. Literally, it means 'standing on its feet' in Portuguese.
the app forwards the noti cation to the Brazilian Ministry of Education, making it harder for the municipality to access federal funds in the future. The motivation behind this intervention is that providing information to citizens empowers individuals to closely monitor public works. This, in turn, results in better social outcomes as public agents become more responsive to community demands. Table 1 depicts the expected e ects for each of the studied outcomes.
The rst intervention was carried out from August 2017 to February 2018 using the Android version of TDP. The randomization was conduct at the municipal level. We randomly selected 344 municipalities to the control group and included 2642 in the treatment group. Our control condition consists in removing all information about school construction from the TDP app in the chosen municipalities, so that citizens were unable to report constructions in the control municipalities.
To evaluate the random assignment, we used the following pre-treatment variables: 1) log of municipal population in 2015; 2) log of number of poor families in each city; 3) log of total federal transfers to the municipality in 2016; 4) federal government indicator for primary school quality; 5) federal government indicator for secondary school quality. The data come from the Brazilian Ministry of Education and the Census. Balance tests show that the randomisation was successful and are available in the Supplementary Materials.
We also conducted two manipulation checks and analysed the number of TDP app downloads by Placebo: Percentage of the project completed before the impact evaluation started.
Null
The placebo outcome, as reported before the intervention, should have a null impact. This represents the absence of di erences between treatment and control prior to the intervention.
Outcome 1: Percentage of the project reported as completed by the end of the intervention period.
Positive
If the intervention has a positive e ect, the rms should increase their e orts toward nishing the construction more quickly.
Outcome 2: Di erence between the percentage reported as completed before and after the intervention.
If the intervention has a positive impact, the di erence between before and after the intervention should re ect this. If the intervention has a positive impact, less constructions should be abandoned and reported as nished in the treatment group.
Outcome 5: Number of schools where construction companies updated the conclusion dates.
If the intervention has a positive e ect, rms and mayor's o ces should be responsive to the public, and update their nishing dates. municipality and over time. Figure 2 displays the results and indicates that the treatment has good territorial variability. There are 455 downloads in the 1023 municipalities in the treatment condition.
Downloads peak during the Facebook TDP campaign, launched in October 2017, then diminish in the following months. The second intervention is similar to intervention 1 in all but three characteristics. First, the TDP app was available for both Android and iOS devices. Second, we randomised the intervention at the school level, with 659 control and 3717 treatment units. We used blocked randomisation strati ed by Brazilian states, school construction status (under construction, stopped, un nished), and whether the municipality spent more on school construction that the distribution median. Finally, the intervention period lasted from August 2018 to February 2019.
Balance tests and manipulation checks were also successful for intervention 2. In total, 443 municipalities downloaded the app. There is about 1,000 user downloads in August 2018, right after intervention 2 starts, and a second spike around December. The number of downloads is smaller in this second intervention as there was no associated social media campaign in that period. We estimate all models using the following regression equation:
where i indexes the experiment units. Y i is one of the six outcomes described above, α is the intercept, β denotes the average treatment e ect, and T i is a binary treatment indicator. γ is a vector of xed e ects, X i is a matrix of Brazilian states' xed e ects, θ is a vector of controls and Z i an array of controls for the case i. The error term is denoted by ε i . We cluster the standard errors at the municipality level as mayors are responsible for school investment decisions in Brazil. Table 2 summarises the main results of intervention 1. Each column represents the treatment e ect of the TDP app on one of the outcomes we measured for this study. All models reported here include the ve control variables described in the previous section and Brazilian states' xed e ects. We also estimated the models without control variables, without xed e ects, and with nearest-neighbour matching. The results are very similar to those below. Note: * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01 Cluster-robust SEs at the municipality level.
We nd that the app only has a small e ect on cancellation rates. The TDP application increases the likelihood of cancelling the construction in 2.07 percent. While this result goes in the opposite direction of our theoretical expectations, the nding is largely inconsistent, and it does not replicate in the second experiment. All other coe cients are not statistically signi cant at conventional levels.
On the one hand, the results indicate that our placebo outcome, the percentage of the invested executed before the intervention, indeed behaves as predicted. On the other hand, we expected the ve remaining outcomes to improve after the introduction of the app. The literature on bottom-up accountability argues that more information about the shortcomings of public service provision will mobilise citizens who, in turn, would pressure state agents to produce better social policies. Our results do not lend support to that hypothesis. Table 3 shows the results of the second intervention. The treatment does not have a statistically signi cant e ect on any our outcomes of interest, including the placebo. This raises further questions about the e ect of the TDP app on school completion. Note that the e ect signs are also inconsistent with improving the outcomes, what demonstrates that our results do not derive from low statistical power or the reduced control group size. Note: * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01 Cluster-robust SEs at the municipality level.
IPW computed by the randomizr package. Figure 4 shows the results of our randomisation inference tests. Randomisation inference allows us to estimate the probability of the sharp null hypothesis over all possible randomisations that could have occurred under our research design (Coppock 2019; Gerber and Green 2012) . We fail to reject the null in all but the nished school indicator in experiment 1. Graphs on the left correspond to randomisation inference estimates for intervention 1 and those on the right describe the results for intervention 2.
We also note that e ect sizes are small in all estimations and that the coe cients ip signs in all but one of our six dependent variables. This provides further evidence for the null results: not only the app would have a low impact even if the treatment were signi cant, but the results could go against what the bottom-up accountability theory predicts. At least in the school construction outcomes we investigate here, we nd little evidence that grassroots monitoring works in the context of school constructions in Brazil.
Discussion
In this paper, we discuss whether a mobile phone application can foster grassroots mobilisation and political accountability in Brazil. Our two interventions show that the results are at best mixed.
Although we nd an e ect on school construction completion and cancelling rates in the rst intervention, the app has no consistent impact on our outcomes of interest. These ndings add to the studies that cast doubts on the relationship between bottom-up accountability and local policy performance (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2010; Lieberman et al. 2014; Ra er et al. 2018) .
What factors, then, are driving these results? It seems unlikely that the null results derive from aws in the research design. First, our study is well powered. Although the treatment is indirect, meaning that the person has to download the app, nd a school construction, and then report it, we included a substantial number of schools in the treatment groups. Second, balance and manipulation tests indicate that the treatment allocation was successful, so we can rule out problems in the randomisation procedures. Third, after doing a series of robustness tests, we still nd no rm evidence of treatment e ect. Finally, note that the sign of the coe cients are frequently contrary to our theoretical expectations. This rules out a possible concern about statistical power with our small control group approach.
A plausible explanation is that individuals were unable to di erentiate the e ect of political corruption from those of spending cuts. Due to the severe economic crisis in 2014-2016, the Brazilian federal government introduced discretionary spending limits that a ected public investment (Mello and Spektor 2016; Rossi and Dweck 2016) . Politicians may argue that delays in school constructions are not derived from their misuse of government funds, but from the austerity measures. If this is the case, citizens will not blame local politicians for the underprovision of public goods. Consequently, representatives can dismiss individual requests as the issue is unlikely to escalate.
Moreover, it is possible that a mobile app like TDP is simply not su cient to promote collective action. Ra er et al. (2018, 29) point out several reasons why information interventions does not lead to higher pressure on public agents, such as citizens' apathy towards their ability to make public agents accountable, lack of o cial channels to support popular demands, or that constituents have more pressing needs than monitoring representatives. Furthermore, individuals may also believe they are better o by free-riding on other users of the TDP app, thus reaping the bene ts of having faster school constructions without incurring personal costs (Olson 1965) .
In sum, our experiments suggest that popular participation and bottom-up monitoring may not be e ective to improve public service delivery in the case of school constructions in Brazil.
Nevertheless, the null ndings are informative to researchers and policy-makers. The most important recommendation derived from this study is that interventions targeting elite groups, such as lobbyists or civil servants, might render better policy outcomes than those focused at the grassroots levels.
Another core lesson is that although digital interventions are promising means to deliver information, perhaps they do not have the same impact as personal, face-to-face communication. Since many developing countries share Brazil's issues with education provision, the shortcomings we describe here serve as warnings for future interventions. Finally, whether this study generalises beyond school constructions to other bottom-up programs, and to other contexts, remains to be studied.
